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A Title IX Conundrum:
Are Campus Visitors Protected from
Sexual Assault?
Hannah Brenner
ABSTRACT: Sexual violence is a significant and longstanding problem on
college campuses that has been made even more visible by recent media
attention to the #MeToo movement. Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 addresses discrimination (including sexual violence) that impedes
access to education; the law demands compliance from federally funded
schools related to their prevention of and response to this problem. The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the law to contain an implied private
right of action that can be brought against a school for its deliberate
indifference to severe and pervasive sex discrimination about which it has
knowledge. However, over the past several years, a handful of courts in the
United States have rendered opinions that have defined, and effectively
narrowed, the class of individuals who are entitled to protection under Title
IX. These cases create two separate classes of individuals with different rights:
students and non-students, or put another way, insiders and outsiders. This
Article seeks to add to the ongoing and complex Title IX conversation by
exposing a novel, yet very real conundrum: To whom does Title IX apply?
Should universities extend greater safety protections to those who are officially
a part of an institution like students, faculty or staff as opposed to those who
are not? Are non-students and other individuals who temporarily interact
within the university context simply left out of the spectrum of Title IX
protections? What sort of campus safety dynamic exists if certain classes of
victims are denied access to Title IX? After extensive analysis, this Article
ultimately concludes that facilitating safer campus communities likely
demands an extension of Title IX rights to those individuals who participate
in campus life, regardless of their official connection to the university.
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.J.D., University of Iowa,
1998. I am grateful to my colleagues at California Western School of Law for their feedback on
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I. INTRODUCTION
Dr. Larry Nassar, an osteopathic physician at Michigan State University
("MSU"), was convicted of sexually abusing numerous young girls, college
students, gymnasts and other athletes over the course of his decades-long
medical career.' The extent and magnitude of the abuse perpetrated by
Nassar is unprecedented.2 As the physician served the first days of a 40-175
i. Carla Correa & Meghan Louttit, More Than 16o Women Say Lany Nassar Sexually Abused
Them. HereAre His Accusers in Their Own Words, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018),https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/ 2oi 8/o / 24/sports/larry-nassarvictims.html.
2. Id.
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year sentence,3 lawyers representing the victims filed civil lawsuits against
MSU on a number of grounds, including allegations that the university
violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the federal civil
rights law that addresses sex discrimination in federally funded education
programs.! The law provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."5 The damages suits brought against
MSU alleged that the university had knowledge of, and acted with deliberate
indifference to an ongoing pattern of sexual violence perpetrated by the
employee doctor.6
As a threshold matter in these civil cases, lawyers defending MSU argued
that the girls and women who were violated by the physician should be divided
into two discrete groups-students and non-students-for purposes of
determining who has the right to access the protections of Title IX.7 At the
crux of this argument, which is supported by the holdings in recent, but
admittedly limited judicial opinions, is the idea that non-students who
experience the same kinds of harm as those who were actually enrolled at the
school lack standing to sue the university for money damages under Title IX.8
It is on these grounds that the MSU lawyers asked the court to dismiss the
cases brought by the non-students.9 The net effect of this motion to dismiss,
if granted, would have been to deny access to the civil legal system, at least vis-
a-vis Title IX, to numerous sexual assault victims. However, months after the
filing of these lawsuits, MSU agreed to a five hundred-million-dollar
settlement with 332 victims.o While a win for the victims, at least insofar as
receiving monetary relief for the egregious harms they experienced, and
3. Zach Schonbrun & Christine Hauser, Larry Nassar, Sentenced in Sexual Abuse Case, Is Back
in Court, N.Y. TIMES (an. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/oi/31/sports/larry-nassar-
sentencing.html. Nassar was separately convicted on child pornography charges, for which he was
sentenced to 6o years in prison. Id.
4. See First Amended Complaint,John Fi Doe ex rel.Jane Fi Doe v. Michigan State Univ.,
2017 WL 4679022 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 1:1 7 -CV-0002 9 -GJQ-ESC), 2017 WL
4679022, at *13.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 168 1 (a) (2012).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Brief in Support ofJoint Omnibus Motion to Dismiss of Defendants at 22-24,
Denhollander v. Mich. State Univ., 208WL 5 806g2 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 1:17-cV-00029-
GJQ-ESC), 2018 WL 580692 [hereinafterJoint Omnibus Brief].
8. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 27o F. Supp. 3 d 556, 560 (D.R.I. 2017), affd, Doe v. Brown
Univ., 896 F.3 d 127, 128 (ist Cit. 2018); KT. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4 :16-CV-i6 5 , 2016
WL 4 24 3965, at *1, affd, K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F-3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017).
9. Joint Omnibus Brief, supra note 7, at 2 2-24.
0. Mitch Smith & Anemona Hartocollis, Michigan State's $5oo Million for Nassar Victims
Dwarfs Other Settlements, N.Y. TIMEs (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20 8/o5/i6/us/
larry-nassar-michigan-state-settlement.html. The settlement by Michigan State, a public university
that is the state's largest, also sent a loud warning to other colleges about the potentially
devastating cost of ignoring misconduct. Id.
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avoiding lengthy litigation proceedings, the settlement nonetheless
precluded the opportunity for a court to weigh in on the non-student standing
issue.
Recently, however, two federal district courts have ruled on point and
their holdings have begun to refine the definition of the class of individuals
entitled to protection from sex discrimination under Title IX.- Specifically,
Doe v. Brown University and K. T. v. Culver-Stockton College precluded non-
students from bringing successful Title IX claims for money damages under a
theory of the schools' deliberate indifference to their allegations of sexual
abuse.,2 These decisions, both of which were affirmed by the First and Eighth
Circuit Courts, respectively, appear to represent an emerging development in
the evolution of Title IX jurisprudence.
Title IX was designed to ensure equal access to education.'3 Subsequent
to the passage of this federal law, a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases defined
the parameters of institutional liability.'4 These cases complement the
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights' regulations that clarify the
requirements Title IX imposes on schools.5 What remains unclear despite
this legislative, judicial, and administrative guidance, however, is whether an
individual must be a student or official member of a particular institution
where the discrimination takes place to benefit from protection of the statute
and ultimately have standing to sue a school for its alleged deliberate
indifference under Title IX. At the core of this question is how to determine
if someone belongs-are they an insider or outsider-for purposes of
securing the protection of this federal law.
At a recent faculty talk, a respected colleague shared a story that
illustrates the impact of the status differential at issue in these cases. He
recalled a college party that took place at the liberal arts school he attended
decades earlier. 6 At the end of a drunken evening, a girl from a neighboring
school, known to none of the partygoers before they met that evening, passed
out on the couch.7 Unable to wake her, and afraid she might be at risk of
serious harm, the students, for lack of alternatives, called a psychology
professor (whose number they happened to have on hand) to help deal with
the stranger who they feared was in peril.,8 The professor inquired of the
students who this girl was and what they wanted him to do; they reacted
i1. See o U.S.C. § 168i(a).
12. Doe, a7oF.Supp. 3dat56 4 ;K.T., 2016WL 4 2 4 39 6 5 ,at*ii.
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
14. For a comprehensive overview of Title IX Supreme Court Jurisprudence, see generally
Gabrielle Fromer et al., Sexual Harassment in Education, 17 GEO.J. GENDER & L. 451 (2o 6).
15. See Reading Room, U.S. DEP'T EDuc., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
frontpage/faq/readingroom.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
16. California Western School of Law Cocktail Napkin Research Presentation Series
(February 13, 2018) (on file with author).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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detachedly and with indifference, stating "she's not one of us.",s Fortunately
for the young woman, the good professor's opinion differed. He replied to
the students, "though that might at one point have been true ... she belongs
now; she is one of you," and then treated her reaction to mixing alcohol and
Quaaludes with kind attention before dropping her off at home later that
morning.o
In this same way, individuals who are non-students at a given university
sometimes find themselves in a setting where they may not technically
"belong," at least insofar as being officially enrolled at the school. But because
of the circumstances in which they find themselves-seeking help from a
university physician, visiting a library, attending a performance on campus,
delivering a guest lecture, participating in a sport recruiting event-their
status inevitably shifts from outsider to insider. When this happens, are these
individuals not entitled to the same protections and rights as others who
might "belong" more officially to the institution? Is their presence on campus,
even temporarily, not enough to trigger protection under Title IX? Because
colleges and universities have become less insular and more open in a variety
of contexts to a wide-range of individuals-some of whom lack official
connection to the school-the question of institutional accountability and
liability to this "outsider" class becomes increasingly relevant.
In the most obvious and narrow expression of their purpose, colleges and
universities exist to educate their enrolled students. But this education is
accomplished by engagement with those both within and outside of the
institutions and their mission therefore deserves a more expansive definition.
To illustrate, consider Stanford University, which prominently and proudly
highlights on its website that it welcomes 150,000 visitors annually onto the
campus." Harvard University's Information Center describes itself in this way:
"Established in 1962, we meet and greet visitors from all over the world."23
And the University of Iowa's website, like many other schools, includes
"visitors" as a separate section of its website alongside students, faculty/staff,
and parents.1
If the promotion of safe campus communities is a priority, and the
extension of the right to be free from discrimination in accessing the offerings
of a university a goal of federal law, it seems irrelevant, discriminatory, and at
odds with Title IX to distinguish among the "kind" of victim who is entitled to
protection. After all, when sexual violence is allowed to proliferate on campus,
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Hannah Brenner & Kathleen Darcy, Toward a Civilized System offJustice: Re-conceptualizing
theResponse to Sexual Violencein HigherEducatior, 102 CORNELLL. REv.ONLINE 127, 131 (2017).
22. About Starnford, STAN. U., https://www.stanford.edu/about (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
23. Visit 1-arvard, HARV. U., https://www.harvard.edu/on-campus/visit-harvard (last visited
Aug. 24, 2018).
24. Visitors, U. IOWA, https://uiowa.edu/visitors (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
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the entire community of students, faculty, and staff is affected.25 Although the
MSU case did not provide ajudicially imposed answer to this question of non-
student standing, the terms of the settlement apply to all of Dr. Nassar's
victims regardless of their enrolled student status. The outcome is consistent
with the spirit of Title IX and illustrates the importance of making the federal
civil rights law available to all those who engage with campus communities.
This Article seeks to add to the ongoing and complex Title IX
conversation by exposing a novel, yet very real conundrum: To whom does Title
IX apply? Should students who are officially enrolled in an institution be
provided different protections than those who are not? Are non-students who
interact within the university context simply left out of the spectrum of Title
IX protections? And what sort of campus safety dynamic is created if we
distinguish between victims when extending protections of the federal law? A
Westlaw search of law review articles with "Title IX" as a keyword revealed
3,260 articles,2 6 and as a word in the title revealed 1,664 articles.27 Despite the
popularity of the topic, none of these articles address these important
questions. The issue of non-student standing is a threshold inquiry that
requires resolution before a court can rule on the merits of a claim and is the
primary focus of this Article.28
Part II of this Article will provide a brief overview of Title IX and its
history. Part III will set forth the problem of sexual violence in higher
education generally and then will consider how this problem is exacerbated
by the context and setting of a quasi-closed institutional system. Part IV will
expose the conundrum of who is entitled to protection under Title IX, relying
on a framework of incomplete rights. This Part will further explore the
relevance of Title IX as a tool for those who experience sex discrimination on
campus. Part V will review the lower court cases that have addressed the issue
of non-students accessing the protections of Title IX and will also explore the
respective circuit court cases that have followed. Part VI will present some
theories that support resolution of this Title IX conundrum and will
25. See generally Victoria L. Banyard et al., Academic Correlates of Unwanted Sexual Contact,
Intercourse, Stalking, and Intimate Partner Violence: An Understudied but Important Consequence for
College Students, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (forthcoming) (revealing how sexual violence on
campus impacts academic performance).
26. Westlaw, THOMSON REUTERS, https:// .next.westlaw.com (search for "Title IX" in
search bar; then select "Secondary Sources" from left side bar; then narrow selection to "Law
Reviews &Journals") (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
27. Westlaw, THOMSON REUTERS, https://1 .next.westlaw.com (click "Advanced" to the right
of the search bar; in the "Name/Title" box within the "Document Fields" section, type "Title IX"
and click the search button; then select "Secondary Sources" from left side bar; then narrow
selection to "Law Reviews &Journals") (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
28. This Article does not seek to opine on the merits of specific cases or whether plaintiffs
have or have not satisfied the legal standards required to successfully litigate a Title IX deliberate
indifference claim. While beyond the scope of this Article, there is an extensive scholarly
literature on these issues. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV.J.L.
& GENDER 217, 222-26 (2005)-
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ultimately conclude that creating safer campus communities likely demands
an extension of rights to all the individuals who participate in campus life.
II. TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
Congress initially passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
out of concern for discrimination based on sex in higher education programs
in receipt of federal funds.29 The purpose of the statute was defined by one
court in this way: "Title IX's statutory language expressly provides a single
avenue for relief from gender discrimination occurring in educational
programs in schools: an expansive administrative enforcement process that
hinges federal funding on compliance with a nondiscriminatory mandate."o
On its face, the Title IX statute reads: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."s' Analyzing the plain
language of the Title IX statute makes obvious many aspects of the law.
Breaking it down into its simplest form, Title IX demands that "no person"
should be "subjected to discrimination" when they are engaged in an
"education program or activity" of an institution of higher education that
receives federal funding. However, the statute on its face is silent (as is the
accompanying guidance promulgated by the Office for Civil Rights and
related Supreme Court jurisprudence) as to the question of whether a non-
student who experiences discrimination is entitled to sue a university for sex
discrimination perpetuated by a student, faculty, or staff member who is
enrolled at or employed by that institution. Further, there is little, if any,
guidance on this question found in the legislative history surrounding the
statute's passage.
Title IX was originally sponsored by Senator Birch Bayh and
Representative Edith Green. According to Senator Bayh, the purpose of the
amendment was to address "the continuation of corrosive and unjustified
discrimination against women" in "the American educational system."32 Title
IX, as it was originally created, was modeled after notions of equality
inherent in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; both laws share a common
purpose: "to ensure that public funds derived from all the people are not
29. Fromer et al., supra note 14, at 452 ("Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
(Title IX) and its implementing regulations prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, including
sexual harassment, in educational programs or activities operated by recipients of federal
financial assistance." (footnotes omitted)).
3o. Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3 d 556, 56o (D.R.I. 2017).
31. 20U.S.C.§ 1681(a) (2012).
32. 1 18 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
992c,181]
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utilized in ways that encourage, subsidize, permit, or result in prohibited
discrimination against some of the people."33
In making the case for the new law, Senator Bayh drew connections
between the importance of education and the ability of women to thrive and
be successful in the world. He reasoned:
The field of education is just one of many areas where differential
treatment has been documented; but because education provides
access to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is doubly
destructive for women. Therefore, a strong and comprehensive
measure is needed to provide women with solid legal protection
from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to
perpetuate second-class citizenship for American women.34
At the time of its passage, the statute responded to a growing concern
about access to education for women. To this end, Senator Bayh lamented,
"[b]ut the simple, if unpleasant, truth is that we still do not have in law the
essential guarantees of equal opportunity in education for men and women."35
Senator Bayh identified three different ways that discrimination might
manifest in an institution of higher education that the Title IX amendment
could address. He clarified, " [w] e are dealing with discrimination in admission
to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies within an
institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment
within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever."3 6
In its original incarnation, the statute was seen as somewhat of a
companion to both Title VI,37 which prohibits racial discrimination by
institutions in receipt of federal funding, and Title VII,38 which prohibits
discrimination in the context of employment. Although the language of Title
IX did not specifically or explicitly reveal an intention to cover sexual
harassment, there was judicial recognition of its extension to these issues as
early as 1977.39 Congress subsequently amended Title IX in 1987 with the
33. Title IX Legal Manual: Discriminatory Conduct, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/education/
docs/title-ix-legal-manual/discriminatory-conduct (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
34. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
35. Id. at 5 8o8.
36. Id. at 5 812.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooa(a) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, providing
that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin").
38. Id. § 2oooe-2(a) (i) (providing that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
39. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that
deprivation of educational benefits resulting from acts "removed from the ordinary educational
10oo [ 104:93
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passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.40 The Act, which
overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell,'l clarified
that the phrase "program or activity" should be broadly construed and in fact
encompassed the entirety of an institution: " [Tihe term 'program or activity'
and 'program' mean all the operations of ... a college, university, or other
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education."2
Several years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act, the
Supreme Court held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County School Board that the Title
IX statute included a private right of action in cases of sexual harassment even
though the statute was silent to this effect on its face.43 The court held "absent
clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power
to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought
pursuant to a federal statute."44 The specific impact of Franklin is explained by
Attorney Emmalena Quesada: "Franklin is significant not only because the
Court awarded damages in an implied rights [sic] of action, but also because
it protects students from sexual harassment within the scope of prohibiting sex
discrimination in educational programs that receive federal funding."is
In 1997, the Office for Civil Rights published guidelines to further define
the parameters of Title IX4 6 and later revised those guidelines in 2001.17 Over
the intervening years, the Department of Education ("DoE") created various
additional guidance in the form of a series of "Dear Colleague" letters.4 These
guidelines, which have evolved over time, direct schools on how to address sex
discrimination on campus including the creation of policies, investigative
procedures, and prevention strategies.
process," such as sexual harassment, can lead to "palpable injuries" redressable by law; the court
went on to say that such deprivations require more detailed allegations of injuries).
40. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687).
41. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 576 (1984)-
42. 2o U.S.C. § 168 7 (2)(A).
43. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 6o, 75 (1992) (holding that sexual
harassment of a student is discrimination on the basis of sex that is in violation of Title IX).
44- Id. at 70-71. Unless Congress has specifically indicated otherwise, "the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant
to a federal statute." Id.
45. Emmalena K. Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment
and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 10 14, 1025 (1998) -
46. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997).
47. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OT-ER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES (2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html#Guidance.
48. See, e.g., Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 201 1 DCL], http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/coleague-20 1o4.pdf.
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Under the current administration in the DoE overseen by Education
Secretary DeVos, significant changes to these guidelines have occured vis-a-vis
a rollback of many of the provisions included in the 2oil "Dear Colleague"
Letter. These changes, which address issues like evidentiary standards and
timelines for investigations, are temporary and will be subject to further
clarification at some point in 2018.49
III. SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE QUASI-CLOSED INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF
HIGHER EDUCATION
Sexual violence5o occurs across all sectors of society.s' It reaches into
Congress,52 Hollywood,53 the legal profession,54 media,55 prisons,5 6 politics,57
49. See generally U.S. DEP'T EDUc., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT (2017) [hereinafter Q&A], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-
title-ix-2o' 7 o9 .pdf (addressing questions related to a school's handling of allegations of sexual
misconduct). For a full discussion of these Title IX policies and procedures see infra Part IV.
50. I choose, with intention, to use the term sexual violence in this Article (and in all of my
scholarship) to refer to a continuum of behavior that includes, but is not limited to, sexual
harassment and rape. Notably, the recent revisions to Title IX guidelines promulgated under the
leadership of Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos include a shift in language used by previous
administrations from "sexual violence" to "sexual misconduct." This shift could be interpreted to
downplay the seriousness of what is occurring on college campuses. The earlier OCR definition
of sexual violence
refers to physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person's will or where a person is
incapable of giving consent due to the victim's use of drugs or alcohol. An individual
also may be unable to give consent due to an intellectual or other disability. A
number of different acts fall into the category of sexual violence, including rape,
sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion. All such acts of sexual violence
are forms of sexual harassment covered under Title IX.
201 I DCL, supra note 48, at 1-2.
51. Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct and Their Fall
from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2o17/1 1/10/us/men-
accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html
52. See, e.g., Heidi M. Przybyla, A List: Members of Congress FacingSexual Misconduct Allegations,
USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/o2017/12/
05/list-members-congress-facing-sexual-misconduct-allegations/ 9 2 3 4 84 0 01 .
53. See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault Harvey Weinstein's
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEWYORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories.
54. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Federal judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual Harassment
Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2o17/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-
retires.html.
55. See, e.g., Ellen Gableretal., NBCFires Matz Lauer, the Face of Today,' N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/1 1/29/business/media/nbc-matt-lauer.html.
56. See, e.g., AllenJ. Beck et al., Sexual Victimization in Prisons and jails Reported By Inmates, 2011-12-
Update, BUREAUJUST. STAT. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid= 4 6 5 4 -
57. See, e.g., Politicians Accused ofSexual Harassment orAssault, N.Y. DAILYNEWS (Jan. 25, 2018,
1o:o6 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politicians-accused-sexual-harassment-assault-gallery-
1.3637822.
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the military, 5 and of course, higher education.5 Its prevalence results in
characterization of the world in which we live as a "rape culture."6 o Perhaps
never before have the voices of victims of sexual violence been so loud,
powerful, and strong as they are now, against the backdrop of the movement
widely known as #MeToo, in which victims have come forward in droves to
share their stories publicly.6 ,
Some of these settings in which sexual violence occurs bear special
characteristics that argue for classification as closed, or quasi-closed systems,
which sets them apart from the broader community.12 This distinction matters
because the context shapes the experiences of survivors of sexual violence as
it relates to the reporting, investigation, and related adjudication of
complaints.
A. PREVALENCE AND DYNAMICS
Research on the prevalence of sexual violence on college campuses
reveals that it is a widespread and regularly occurring problem. The National
Sexual Violence Sexual Resource Center reports that as many as one in five
women and one in 16 men are raped during college. 63 In fact, it is during the
college years that a woman in college is more likely to be a victim of rape or
attempted rape compared to the time before she enters college. 64 Members
of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") community are at an
even greater risk.5 These numbers tell only part of the story, as it is well known
58. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, How the Military Handles Sexual Assault Cases Behind Closed Doors,
WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-the-military-
handles-sexual-assault-cases-behind-closed-doors/201 7 /o 9 / 3 O/agdfo682-672a- 1e7-aid7-9a32C9ic6
f4 ostory.html.
59. See, e.g., Nell Gluckman et al., Sexual Harassment and Assault in HigherEd: What's Happened
Since Weinstein, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10, 2018, 7:15 PM), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/Tracking-Higher-Ed-s-MeToo/241757.
6o. For a wide-ranging discussion of rape culture, see generally TRANSFORMING A RAPE
CULTURE (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
61. Jessica Bennett, Editorial, The #MeToo Moment: No Longer Complicit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2o17/12/o 7 /us/the-metoo-moment-no-longer-complicit.html.
62. Brenner & Darcy, supra note 21, at 129-32.
63. CI-IRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY 5-1, 5-5 (Oct.
2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/nij/grants/22 1153.pdf; NAT'L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES.
CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2015), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/
publications nsvrc-factsheet media-packetstatistics-about-sexual-violence-o.pdf.
64. KREBS ET AL., supra note 63, at 6-1.
65. Sexual Assault and the LGBT Community, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/
resources/sexual-assault-and-the-lgbt-community (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) ("46 percent of
bisexual women have been raped, compared to 17 percent of heterosexual women and 13 percent
of lesbians ... 22 percent of bisexual women have been raped by an intimate partner, compared to
9 percent of heterosexual women ... 47% of transgender people are sexually assaulted at some
point in their lifetime.").
2018] 10og
IOWA LAWREVIEW
that sexual violence occurs across all sectors of society and is widely
underreported. 66
Simply reporting the statistics surrounding sexual violence on campuses,
however, without more, fails to provide an accurate depiction of the culture
and context in which such violence occurs.
Statistics do not describe who the victims are, or they ways in which sexual
violence takes place. It is easy to simply dismiss the campus sexual abuse
problem as one involving isolated incidents of date rape between students. To
combat this tendency, it is imperative to develop a complete picture of the
kinds of incidents that occur, including the status of the respective parties
involved. As but one example, Professor Nancy Chi Cantalupo and Research
Associate William Kidder compellingly provide a comprehensive and novel
study of faculty on student (and specifically graduate student) sexual
harassment that exposes a nuanced dimension of sexual harassment not
previously understood or reported. 67
Other scholars' research dispels the myth that reported incidents of
sexual violence are nothing more than isolated dating situations gone wrong.
As but one example, Professor Diane Rosenfeld highlights the phenomenon
of intentional and calculated "target rapes" as
cases where males ally together in sexual pursuit of females not only
regardless of the female's sexual desire, but often in deliberate
violation of it. Male-only exclusive spaces, such as fraternities or
athletic teams, often serve as breeding grounds for the transmission
of misogynistic attitudes that contribute to a sexual culture on
campus that devalues women.68
Rosenfeld's perspective suggests that at least in some contexts, there is a
deliberate and intentional dimension to sexual violence.
66. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T JUST., EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES Or RAPE VICTIMI7ATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
SURVEY 33 (2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/21o 3 4 6.pdf ("Only 19.1 percent of the
women and 12.9 percent of the men who were raped since their s8th birthday said their rape was
reported to the police."); Eliza A. Lehner, Note, Rape Process Templates: A Hidden Cause of the
Underreporting of Rape, 29 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 207, 209 (2017) ("[Flewer than a third of [rape]
victims-somewhere between 5% and 33%-report their rape to the police."); see also Nancy Chi
Cantalupo & William C. Kidder, A Systematic Look at a Serial Problem: Sexual Harassment of Students by
University Faculty, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 671, 683-84 (2o 18) (" [T) hat sexual harassment is a significant
and consistently underreported problem, whether on a campus or not, is well-established."); Gina
Maisto Smith & Leslie M. Gomez, The Regional Center for Investigation and Adjudication: A Proposed
Solution to the Challenges of Title IX Investigations in Higher Education, DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE,
Spring 201 6, at 27, 29 ("There is significant underreporting and delayed reporting, both on college
campuses and in society at large, and delays in reporting can result in the loss of whatever physical
or other forensic evidence may have been available shortly after the incident.").
67. See generally Cantalupo & Kidder, supra note 66 (analyzing media reports, lawsuits and
civil right investigations).
68. Diane L. Rosenfeld, Uncomfortable Conversations: Confronting the Reality of Target Rape on
Campus, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 359, 372-73 (2015)-
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It is also evident from recent headlines that incidents of sexual violence
sometimes occur in unexpected places on college campuses. As noted earlier,
Michigan State University, one of the nation's largest public universities, has
been the site of a massive sex abuse scandal involving not a student or faculty
perpetrator, but a university physician. Dr. Nassar worked for Michigan State
University's Sports Medicine Clinic for decades. 69 He was recently convicted
and sentenced to prison for sexually abusing literally hundreds of community
members, students, and student athletes under the guise of providing
"legitimate" medical treatment.7 0
Research also reveals that the athletic culture on all campuses appears to
further increase the risk of sexual violence. " [I] t is not just elite athletes in
big-time athletic programs who are at an elevated risk of engaging in sexual
misconduct; athletes participating atlower levels of organized college sport[s]
are also at higher risk."7' In a recent study, 54% of male athletes reported they
perpetrated sexual coercion, as opposed to 38% of those who were not
athletes.72 Further, one's participation in a school's athletic program can
impact the outcome of sexual assault complaints. "Cases currently pending
may reveal instances where sexual assailants have been falsely exonerated or
insufficiently punished because of their connection to important school
sports teams."73 Sometimes, such incidents are never formally reported.74
These limited examples illustrate how the reach of Title IX as it was
perhaps initially contemplated is deserving of clarification and revision
because sexual violence occurs in a wide range of contexts, many of which are
unanticipated. If at the core of this federal law is the goal of addressing the
widespread problem of sex discrimination, including all forms of sexual
violence on campus, it is imperative to first develop an understanding of
69. Christine Hauser & Maggie Astor, The Larry Nassar Case: What Happened and 1low the
Fallout is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20 8/o i /25/sports/
larry-nassar-gymnastics-abuse.html. Michigan State is not the only university where sexual
violence occurred in this type of setting. Allegations against physicians at both Ohio State and
USC reveal similar patterns. Catie Edmondson, More Than oo Former Ohio State Students Allege
Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2O18/07/20/US/
politics/sexual-misconduct-ohio-state.html; Harriet Ryan et al., A USC Doctor Was Accused of Bad
Behavior with Young Women Jor Years. The University Let Him Continue Treating Students, L.A. TIMES
(May 16, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-usc-doctor-misconduct-complaints-
2018051 5 -story.html.
70. See Hauser & Astor, supra note 69.
71. Deborah L. Brake, Fighting the Rape Culture Wars Through the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard, 78 MONT. L. REv. 109, 1 19 (2017).
72. Belinda-Rose Young et al., Sexual Coercion Practices Among Undergraduate Male Recreational
Athletes, Intercollegiate Athletes, and Non-Athletes, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 795, 804 (2017).
73. Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due
Process?, 96 TEX. L. REv. 15, 58 (2017).
74. Samantha Schmidt, Student Accuses 3 Michigan State Basketball Players of Raping-er in 2015,
WASH. POst (Apr. IO, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-mix/wp/201 8 /04/
1o/student-sue-michigan-state-accusing3-basketball-players-of-raping-her.
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institutional context and then refine federal guidelines and related
jurisprudence to ensure access to justice for those deserving of the law's
protection.
B. THE STATUS OFINSTITUTFONS
The concepts of closed systems or "total institutions" are originally
attributed to social scientist Erving Goffman, who used these terms to refer to
places where people both live and work and are at the same time isolated from
the larger community for a significant length of time; he contemplated places
like prisons, military systems, and mental institutions as quintessential
examples of such entities.75 According to Goffman, total institutions include
places where "all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under
the same single authority."7 6 The truly closed nature of places like the military
and immigration detention facilities fosters an environment in which sexual
victimization occurs behind closed doors, "often without knowledge of or
intervention by those on the outside."77 The internal processes that exist to
address sexual victimization in these settings "allow for sweeping discretion
on the part of system actors."78
The unique structure of a closed system means that it lacks the
influence and oversight of external actors. It exists much like a silo,
isolated from the outside world and other closed systems. This
isolation frequently leads to problems within that are compounded
by biases or assumptions that shape the system's internal structures
and processes.... The public often has no idea about the inner
workings of such a system.79
75. Erving Goffman, The Characteristics of Total Institutions, in ORGANIZATION AND SOCIETY
312, 314-15 (ig61). Goffman is widely known amongst sociologists as having defined the
concept of the total institution. See Christie Davies, Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution:
Criticisms and Revisions, 12 HUM. STUD. 77, 77-78 (1989) (crediting Goffman with the term "total
institution" and discussing reliance on the term by other scholars).
76. Goffman, supra note 75, at 313-14.
77. Hannah Brenner et al., Sexual Violence as an Occupational Hazards and Conditions of Confinement
in the Closed Institutional Systems of the Military and Detention, 44 PEPP. L. REv. 88 I, 886 (2017).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 890 (footnotes omitted).
Sexual violence is prevalent in closed systems in part due to ... the power imbalance
inherent in the hierarchy of these systems, and the existence of a tightly knit
protective culture. The system will assume a "state-like" role in members' lives where
the internal structures and processes are the primary and initial governing body,
supplanting civilian law and policy. These systems are self-governing, with a complex
and often self-created set of policies and procedures, as well as a detailed and highly
constraining set of informal norms that govern appropriate behavior. The informal
norms may supersede official policy and procedure; therefore, the system is
disincentivized from investigating and punishing perpetrators of sexual violence
because doing so would admit its existence within the system.
Id. at 891 (footnotes omitted).
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Building on Goffman's characterization of closed systems, my earlier
research extensively considers the specific and very different ways in which
sexual violence is both perpetrated and subsequently addressed within such
systems.so I argue specifically that the closed nature of prisons, military, and
immigration detention centers creates substantial barriers that impede efforts
to address the widespread problem of sexual abuse that occurs inside.8 There
are significant differences related to what happens after a woman is raped in
the broader community context, in contrast to when she is raped in a closed
institutional system.82 The differences relate to the "reporting, investigation,
and accountability" of perpetrators and system actors. 83 For example, in a
closed system like prison, a victim of sexual violence does not have free and
open access to the criminal justice system; even choosing whether or if to call
91 i is not an available option. Involving law enforcement is a decision that
rests in the hands of prison personnel. Further, a victim must also first exhaust
the administrative remedies that govern the prison before accessing civil
avenues ofjustice.84
Although colleges and universities, as institutions of higher education,
bear many of the characteristics of closed systems, they do not quite rise to
the level of definition as a total institution or traditional closed system.85 To
be sure, as mentioned earlier, these entities anticipate the presence of
"outsiders" (vis-a-vis campus visitors) as a regular and expected part of their
communities. 86 Therefore, higher education is more accurately described as
"quasi-closed," meaning it includes many, but not all, of the hallmarks of a
true closed institutional system.87 This status is important because it reveals
some of the special problems inherent in addressing sexual violence that
occurs within settings that are separate from the broader society. As a
preliminary matter, colleges and universities are not entirely closed off and
insular (as is the case with prisons, for example.) They are also not entirely
open in the way a community is, and they therefore occupy a more middle
8o. Id. at 956.
8 i. Id.
Prison, as a system within the broader community, is a quintessential closed system;
it confers a unique identity to individuals, who become inmates, upon entrance. This
prisoner identity carries with it certain stereotypes that inform widely-held myths
about rape. Prison is governed by specially crafted policies and procedures that
intersect with state and federal laws and standards to provide a complex framework
governing the reporting, investigation, and civil and criminal litigation surrounding
sexual victimization.
Brenner & Darcy, supra note 21, at 129.
82. Brenner & Darcy, supra note 21, at I29.
83. Id.
84. Brenner et al., supra note 77, at 902.
85. See Brenner & Darcy, supra note 2 1, at 131-32.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 132.
20181 107
IOWA LAWREVIEW
ground. Although the membership of colleges and universities is perhaps
easily defined by enrollment as a student or employment as faculty or staff,
non-members routinely find themselves on campuses in a myriad of different
capacities.
A closed or quasi-closed institutional setting often impedes the ability of
survivors of sexual abuse inside the system to seekjustice in ways survivors on
the outside do not experience.88 As Professor Brake relates, "[r]eactions to
claims of sexual assault, including victim-blaming and denying harm, are not
just the product of societal and cultural beliefs, but are shaped by the
institutional cultures in which sexual misconduct occurs."89 One
characteristic element of a system that is closed at least in limited part is a
disconnection from general societal norms, laws, and resources surrounding
sexual violence. This "closed off' nature often thwarts even the most forward-
thinking law and policy changes from being effectively implemented, if at all.
Professor Trachtenberg makes the point about the insular nature of Title IX
investigations: "If a student is treated unfairly, outside observers will not have
the chance to see and object."90 The lack of transparency is a distinguishing
facet of sexual violence that occurs in higher education contexts.
There also exists a strong loyalty among system actors to the institution
itself,9' which often undercuts the fairness of the sexual assault investigation
process and can impact a victim's decision to even report what happened in
the first place. Professor Francine Banner explores this phenomenon of
institutional loyalty across systems like the military and higher education in
the context of a broader rights/trust dilemma. "Whether true or false,
reporting a rape is viewed as a significant threat to institutional loyalty."92
The unfairness that flows from system loyalty can impact both parties in a case,
depending on the particular dynamics. To this point, ProfessorJed Rubenfeld
opines: "The truth is that academic institutions are self-interested parties in
their own campus rape cases. Their self-interest can bias them in some cases
against victims, in others against the accused."93 The case of sexual abuse
perpetrated by Dr. Nassar at Michigan State University is a representative
example of this phenomenon. The individuals tasked with responsibility for
investigating the reports of sexual abuse by women and girls against Nassar
88. Id. at 1 3 2- 3 3 .
89. Brake, supra note 71, at 121.
go. Ben Trachtenberg, How University Title IX Enforcement and Other Discipline Processes
(Probably) Discriminate Against Minority Students, 18 NEV. L.J. 107, 141 (2017).
91. Francine Banner, Institutional Sexual Assault and the Rights/Trust Dilemma, 13 CARDOZO PUB.
L., POLY & ETHICSJ. 97, 142-43 (2014) ("As it would have been were she enlisted in the armed
forces, within the university context, the assertion of rights of the university student is circumscribed
by processes geared toward preserving public and member loyalty in the institution.").
92. Id.at1 4 8.
93. Rubenfeld, supra note 73, at 57-58.
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were all members of the same institution.94 This is not unique to just one
school, but instead a phenomenon inherent in the quasi-closed systems of
higher education where Title IX offices act as the prosecution and defense,
judge, and jury. As Professor Rubenfeld observes, "[o] ne piece of the
partiality problem may be the government-mandated creation at every school
of a Title IX office vested with training, prosecutorial, investigatory, and
adjudicatory authority.",. Further, often the witnesses relied on in a Title IX
investigation are also not disinterested or impartial, but they also possess a
certain loyalty to the school. This was the case with the witnesses interviewed
as part of the investigation into at least one of the Title IX complaints filed
with MSU by a patient of Dr. Nassar; all were friends and colleagues of the
doctor and worked for same institutionW3 Nassar was cleared of the allegations
against him in part "based on the opinions of four medical experts who all
worked for the university and had close ties to Nassar."97 Title IX is routinely
criticized for its utilization of members of the system to carry out its mandate,
and its dual accountability to students-both those making allegations and
those accused of wrongdoing-as part of the investigatory and judgment
process.9 8 Impartiality is often elusive in the Title IX process.
IV. EXPOSING THE TITLE IX CONUNDRUM: WHOSE RIGHTS?
Each year, colleges and universities court star high school athletes, vying
for their enrollment. Consider the case of K.T., a high school soccer recruit,
who was invited to visit the campus of Culver-Stockton College ("College") in
Canton, Missouri.99 Her visit was part of an "athletic activity" that was
"sponsored and promoted by the school."oo While she was on campus, she
was taken to a party at the Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity house, where she was
sexually assaulted by a student who was enrolled at the college.o' Other
individuals present at the time reported the incident to the school the same
weekend the assault took place and K.T.'s family reported the incident to law
94. Matt Mencarini, MSUHid Full Conclusions of 2014 Nassar Report from Victim, LANSING ST.J.
(Jan. 26, 2018, 4 :2 3 PM), https://www.1ansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/201 8/O l/26/
michigan-state-larry-nassar-title-ix/io
6 9493001; see also Hannah Brenner, Opinion: DeVos' New
Guidelines on Handling Campus Sexual Assault Raise Risk of Another MSU, DETROIrT FREE PRESS
(Jan. 26, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/o/26/msu-
title-g/ io6591300 .
95. Rubenfeld, supra note 73, at 59.
96. Mencarini, supra note 94.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. KT. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No- 4 :i6-CV-i6 5 , 2016 WL 4243965, at *I (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 11, 2016).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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enforcement a week later. o2 The College did not commence an investigation
and did not respond or attempt to take corrective action other than to cancel
a meeting with K-T. and her parents once they learned of the nature of the
requested meeting.1o3 K.T. filed a lawsuit against the school under Title IX
relying on a theory of the school's deliberate indifference, but the case was
dismissed based on her non-student status. 0 4
It is not a stretch to imagine a similar hypothetical, inspired by several
judicial opinions that have grappled with these very issues. Imagine two
childhood best friends, A and B, who are now away at college in different
states. One friend, A, visits the other, B, at her college, a state school, for
spring break, and the two attend a university student affairs' sponsored spring
break concert. At the concert at the student union, the friends meet several
male students who eventually drug and rape the two young women in the
basement of the student union. When the friends return to the dorm where
they are staying, they report what happened to B's Resident Advisor, and both
file a complaint under the university's Title IX policy on sexual misconduct.o5
The university fails to adequately investigate their complaints and ultimately
concludes in its official report there was no violation of university policy. In
addition to the university's failure to obtain testimony from available witnesses
who observed the events of the night in question, officials were on notice at
least five other rapes were perpetrated by members of the same fraternity over
the past semester. The women each hire an attorney to sue the university for
damages for what they allege is its deliberate indifference to their assault. The
district court allows B's case to proceed, but dismisses A's case, concluding A,
as a non-student, lacks standing to sue the university under Title IX. Here, two
similarly situated victims of rape are treated differently under the law, similar
to the Michigan State victims and the victim in K. T. v. Culver-Stockton College,
discussed above, based on their respective status as a member or non-member
of the university community.
The outcome of this hypothetical is consistent with the reality that victims
who are non-students at an institution where the sex discrimination took place
102. Id. Schools are required to promulgate grievance policies under Title IX. "The
Department's Title IX regulations require a recipient to adopt and publish grievance procedures
providing for the prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints under
Title IX." U.S. DEP'T EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE (Apr. 2015)[hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-title-ix-
coordinators-guide-2o 1 504.pdf.
103. KT. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3 d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2017).
104. KT v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4 :1 6-CV- 165, 2o16 WL 4243965, at * 1 (E.D. Mo. Aug.
11, 2016), affd, KT. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3 d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017). "The Court
concludes that plaintiff, as a non-student, cannot bring a Title IX claim against the College." Id.
The court also dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
but even if this was not the case, her non-student status precludes resolution of the complaint in
her favor.
105. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 102.
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are being denied the right to access the protections of Title IX, illustrating a
trend playing out in what may well become an expanding group of cases
across the United States. Admittedly, it is hard to know with certainty just how
many cases align with these facts especially in light of notoriously low
reporting rates for sexual violence.,o6 The National Institute of Justice finds
that "[t] he majority of sexual assaults are not reported to the authorities."107
Further exacerbating the problem of low reporting is a lack of consistent
messaging about the available rights for victims generally, and specifically for
those who occupy this slightly different status as non-students. The pool of
potential claimants may well be quite lowos but this should not be construed
as a reason not to resolve the very real question of whether those individuals
who are not enrolled as students at an institution where they are subject to
sex discrimination, but are engaged in campus activities, should be afforded
protection by Title IX.
To address the problem of sex discrimination in federally-funded
education institutions, Title IX has evolved to specifically cover sexual
violence and harassment (as a form of sex discrimination) on campuses.,o
The law has been subject to Congressional action,' o and judicial
interpretation," including several landmark cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court.2
The reach of the law has also been defined by guidelines promulgated by
the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights, which outline specific
requirements that are tied to receipt of schools' federal funds.' '3 A shift in
presidential administrations often results in sweeping changes in the
guidelines supporting federal laws.' "4 The expansion of Title IX occurred
io6. Office ofJustice Programs, Reporting of Sexual Violence Incidents, NAT'L. INST. OFJUSTICE,
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/pages/rape-notification.aspx (last visited
Aug. 24, 2018).
107. Id. Between 1992-2000, "[o]nly 36 percent of rapes, 34 percent of attempted rapes,
and 26 percent of sexual assaults were reported." Id.
io8. Further, "[l]itigation of Title IX complaints is even further behind with few cases having
advanced beyond initial motions." Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Relying on Title IX A Mistake?, 64 KAN.
L. REV. 891, 9 2 (2016).
109. See Wes R. McCart, Simpson v. University of Colorado: Title IX Crashes the Party in College
Athletic Recruiting, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 153, 154 (2oo8). In the past, plaintiffs most commonly
invoked Title IX to ensure equal representation and funding for female students in
interscholastic athletics. Id. at 155-
110. Seee.g.,2oU.S.C.§ 1687 (2012).
Il. "The elaboration of the specific iterations of a statutory ban on discrimination through
judicial construction is a common feature of U.S. civil rights law." Brake, supra note 71, at 125-
112. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (holding that
students may bring private causes of action against schools if they experience sexual harassment
by teachers).
113. See, e.g., RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 102.
114. "Like many laws, Title IX's power stems from a new administration coming to
Washington and deciding an issue was worth prioritizing." Diana Moskovitz, mWy Title IX I-las
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largely from agency guidelines influenced by various presidential regimes. As
Professor Karen Tani explains, "[mlodern American history is rife with
examples of administrative agencies creating new rights, or at least playing
significant roles in their generation, elaboration, and legitimization.""5
Therefore, Title IX is not the only such statute that has evolved in this way.
Indeed, this very phenomenon occurred recently with the transition in
the Department of Education's leadership following President Trump's
appointment of Betsy DeVos." 6 In her early months occupying the new role
as Secretary of Education, DeVos openly criticized the Title IX statute and
expressed concerns about denial of due process rights for those accused of
sexual assault on college campuses.' '7 She swiftly rescinded the arguably more
victim-centered Obama-era provisions expressed in the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter 8 and in its place issued temporary guidelines, which effectively extend
significant deference to schools to create their own processes to address
sexual violence.' 19 Among the changes include giving schools discretion to
choose which of two evidentiary standards to use to resolve complaints
(preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing evidence); eliminating
the recommended timeframe in which investigations should proceed;
downplaying the seriousness of complaints by changing the language
describing the proscribed behavior from "sexual violence" to "sexual
misconduct;" allowing schools the option to decide whether to provide a right
of appeal, if at all, and whether to extend this right solely to alleged
perpetrators. 20 Despite the vast departure from the previous guidelines
outlined by the 2oi1 Dear Colleague letter, most schools are awaiting
anticipated final guidelines designed to supplant these temporary measures
before making significant changes to their policies and practices. 21
Failed Everyone on Campus Rape, DEADSPIN (July 7, 2016, 2:58 PM), https://deadspin.com/why-
title-ix-has-failed-everyone-on-campus-rape-1765565925.
1 15. Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence: Title IX Enforcement
in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1879 (2017) (describing how various
agencies like the NLRB and FTC created early anti-discrimination policies that pre-dated both
the passage of Title VII and related Supreme Court jurisprudence).
1 16. Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, Prepared Remarks on Title IX Enforcement at
George Mason University (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-
prepared-remarks-title-ix-enforcement.
117. Id.; Stephanie Saul & Dana Goldstein, Betsy DeVos Says She Will Rewrite Rules on Campus
Sex Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/201 7 /0 9 /0 7 /us/devos-
campus-rape.html.
1 18. 2011 DCL, supra note 48. "When the 2011 Dear Colleague letter came out, what
mattered most was the message it sent: Take campus rape seriously, or there will be significant
consequences, including losing federal funds." Moskovitz, supra note 1 14-
119. See generally Q&A, supra note 49 (addressing questions related to a school's handling of
allegations of sexual misconduct).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Todd Spangler, Michigan Universities Take a Wait-and-See Approach to Betsy DeVos
Sexual Assault Plan, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:07 PM), https://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/michigan/2 o 17/09/07/mich-universities-devos-titleix/6 4 4o 2001.
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Even before the DeVos-initiated changes, Title IX was subject to critique
by legal scholars and others for a myriad of reasons: concerns surrounding
due process for the accused; 12 ineffective investigations by universities once
complaints are filed; 23 the efficiency with which investigations are handled
through the Office for Civil Rights;I24 the means by which the Department of
Education promulgated its guidelines; 25 and perhaps most controversially,
the identification of appropriate evidentiary standards for school
investigations. 2 To this latter point, before DeVos' sweeping reforms, schools
were required to apply a "preponderance of the evidence" 27 standard to Title
IX sex discrimination claims, evaluating their legitimacy based on whether the
allegations were more likely than not to be true.''5 DeVos has now given
schools discretion to choose to implement a higher standard of proof, the
"clear and convincing" 29 evidentiary standard, which is more consistent with
122. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Complicated Process, 125 YALE L.J.F. 442, 442-43 (20 16); see also
Tamara Rice Lave, A Critical Look at How Top Colleges and Universities Are Adjudicating Sexual Assault,
71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 415 (2017) (reporting on empirical research findings regarding Title
IX investigations at the 20 most highly ranked institutions of higher education in the United
States that illustrate problems with due process rights of the accused); CoryJ. Schoonmaker, An
"F" In Due Process: How Colleges Fail When Handling Sexual Assault, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 2 13, 2 I 4
(2016) (arguing that the 201 1 Dear Colleague Letter thwarts due process rights afforded to those
accused of sexual violence).
123. See Smith & Gomez, supra note 66, at 31 ("While the federal government's goal is noble,
and we wholeheartedly endorse the requirements of education, training, and rigor
in investigations, both the national dialogue on these issues and the federal enforcement efforts
fail to take into account the tremendous complexity of the issues, the context of educational
institutions, privacy considerations, and other impediments to effective implementation
of Title IX on college campuses. Indeed, the current enforcement framework and evolving
expectations of the courts seem to be requiring educational institutions to subsume a criminal
justice function without the resources to do so effectively.").
1 24. Alyssa Peterson & Olivia Ortiz, A Better Balance: Providing Survivors of Sexual Violence with
"Effective Protection "Against Sex Discrimination Through Title IX Complaints, 1 25 YALE L.J. 2 132, 2 1 32
(20 16).
125. Sheridan Caldwell, Note, OCR's Bind: Administrative Rulemaking and Campus Sexual
Assault Protections, 1 12 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 454-55 (2017).
126. In response to the questions following DeVos' changes to Title IX, a group of law
professors with wide-ranging perspectives presented a Hot Topics Panel at the 201 8 AALS Annual
Meeting. The panel, Rethinking Campus Response to Sexual Violence: Betsy DeVos, Title IX, and the
Continuing Search for Access to justice, which I co-organized with Professor Meg Penrose, considered
varying viewpoints on whether and how Title IX should continue to address sexual violence on
campuses.
127. See Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (toth ed. 2014) ("The greater
weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying
to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that,
though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline
a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.").
128. 201 1 DCL, supra note 48.
I 29. "Evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain. This is a greater burden than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in
most civil trials, but less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal
trials." Evidence, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014)-
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the criminal law.so Prior to DeVos altering the evidentiary playing field,
however, there was a longstanding and deep divide among those interested in
these issues about the appropriateness of relying on such a low standard of
proof to determine culpability given the potentially extreme consequences
for the accused.'s
Despite this widespread critique, the question of Title IX's extension to
non-students has largely gone unnoticed by scholars and policymakers with
only limited exception.'s3 Professor Tani identifies this gap in protection as
one reflecting the characteristic incompleteness of agency rights.'ss Tani
writes, " [p] erhaps the most important aspect of administratively created rights
is their incompleteness, owing to the incompleteness of agencies'
jurisdictions."'34 Tani's acknowledgment of this problem, however, appears
only as an afterthought in her article outlining the administrative rights
conferred on victims of sexual violence by Title IX.'ss "In this case, it means
130. Q&A, supra note 49, at 5. This change in evidentiary standard has been criticized for its
similarity to the criminal law. "[T] he Title IX movement must remain vigilant against pushes to
'criminalize' Title IX." Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations
and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J.F. 281, 283 (2016).
131. Legal scholars are divided on the appropriateness of the preponderance of the evidence
standard. For a discussion of the merits of utilizing a preponderance standard, see Katharine K.
Baker et al., Title IX & the Preponderance of the Evidence: A While Paper, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS BLOG,
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-content/uploads/2oi 6/ 11 /Title-IX-Preponderance-White-
Paper-signed-i 1.29.1 6.pdf; see also Brake, supra note 71, at 131 ("While the substantive difference
between the two proof standards, in itself, is unlikely to be outcome-determinative, the clear and
convincing standard permits greater room for decision-makers to hold complainants to unrealistic
proof expectations."). Other legal scholars take alternative positions out of concern for due process
rights of the accused. See EuZABETH BARTiOLET ET AL., FAIRNESS FOR ALL STUDENTS UNDER TILE
IX (Aug. 21, 2017), available at https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/l/ 3 3 7 8 9 4 3 4 /
Fairness%2ofor%2OAl% 2oStudents.pdf; see also Gaines West et al., Title IX: The Difficulties in Protecting
an Accused's Rights, 8o TEX. B.J. 510, 510 (2017), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm
?Section=articles&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD= 3 7 7 5 5 . There are also some
who have identified common ground between the two perspectives. See, e.g., Alexandra Brodsky, A
Rising Tide: Learning About Fair Disciplinary Process from TitleIX, 66J. LEGAL EDUC. 822, 828 (2017)
("Apart from common ethical commitments, both advocates for accused students and advocates for
student victims of gender violence benefit strategically from fair, equitable procedures."). And other
scholars do not see a significant difference between the two. See Brake, supra note 7 1, at i 30.
For all the controversy over the POE standard, it is far from clear what the distance
is, substantively, between the POE standard and its main competitor, the clear and
convincing evidence standard . . . . It is even more difficult to tell how often the
choice of proof standards would be outcome-determinative in campus disciplinary
proceedings involving sexual misconduct. Accused students have been cleared of
sexual assault charges under the POE standard despite substantial evidentiary
support for the allegations.
Id.
132. As but one example, a comprehensive law review article outlining with extensive detail the
history and reach of Title IX fails to acknowledge this distinction. Fromer et al., supra note 14, at 470.
133. Tani, supra note 115, at 1898.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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that individuals who are no longer, or have never been, part of educational
communities have no access to the administratively created right."'s6 As
central to her incompleteness critique, Tani is concerned with the lack of
universality of agency rights as contemplated specifically by Title IX.' 37
At first glance, the significance of this inquiry might be overlooked. After
all, some of the same rights protected by Title IX can arguably be reached vis-
a-vis tort law, criminal law, or by filing a grievance with the Office of Civil
Rights ("OCR").. B8 Individuals who are sexually victimized and lack an official
connection to the education institution where the abuse occurred do in fact
have other avenues of legal recourse, but these alternate avenues serve
different goals and interests'39 and have not always been entirely useful or
productive for victims. Tani argues this point, "[t]o the extent that such
individuals want to assert a right to be free from sexual violence, they must do
so in spaces (state courts) and through systems (state and local law
enforcement) that have been notoriously unreceptive to such claims." 40 It is
widely understood, for example, that victims of sexual violence often choose
not to file criminal complaints; 14 the reasons for these choices vary, but often
relate to a fear of not being believed or being retaliated against, or from an
expectation that the process will not result in a productive, or positive,
outcome. l 2 Recent evidence emerging from the MSU sex abuse scandal
136. Id.
137. Id. Tani contends that the incompleteness of agency rights conferred by Title IX is
evidenced also in the fact that the statute only reaches educational institutions that are in receipt
of federal funds. While she concedes this includes a lot of individuals, it is nonetheless not
"universal." Id. at 1897-98.
138. Despite some of the limitations and challenges, there is growing interest among some
scholars to utilize tort law as a way to address sexual violence. See, e.g, Sarah L. Swan, Between Title
IX and the Criminal Law: Bringing Tort Law to the Camnpus Sexual Assault Debate, 64 KAN. L. REV. 963,
965 (2016) [hereinafter Swan, Tort Law] ("In addition to being a crime, and a civil rights
violation, campus sexual assault is also a private, tortious wrong, and thus potentially subject to
adjudication in civil court, using the usual rules of civil procedure."); see also Sarah Swan,
Article, Tiangulating Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 403, 443 (2013) (discussing
obstacles for rape victims to bring civil claims).
139. It is well understood that one of the foremost goals of tort law is to make whole a victim
who suffers harm. Pam A. Mueller, Victimhood & Agency: Ilow Taking Charge Takes Its Toll, 4 4 PEPP.
L. REv. 691, 694 (2017) ("Most scholars-regardless of the underlying theory of tort they
support-agree that making the victim whole is a fundamental goal of tort law.").
140. Tani, supra note 115, at 1898. Some activists who oppose progressive reforms actually
work to deny access to both criminal law and campus processes. "[M]any are attempting to close
the courthouse doors to victims of acquaintance rape without extrinsic force, and then close the
doors to campus tribunals to those same victims as well." Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual
Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1995 (2016).
141. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 66, at 33 (reporting that only 19.1% of adult women
and 12.9% of adult men reported the crime to police).
142. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2017); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 205,
206 (2017) (arguing through empirical evidence the reality that police are the largest obstacle to
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involving Dr. Nassar illustrates the un-receptiveness of law enforcement Tani
describes, and reinforces the legitimacy of victims' fears."'s An FBI
investigation into allegations that Nassar continued abusing his patients went
on over the course of an entire year before investigators even contacted two
of the three primary victims.'14 Throughout the investigation, Dr. Nassar
continued to see patients, and it is believed he abused at least 40 additional
women and girls while the FBI dragged its feet in pursuing the
investigation.145 Further, according to Title IX expert Professor Cantalupo,
"the criminal law is not concerned with establishing equality, and it gives few,
if any, rights to violence victims."4 6 Recent efforts on the part of some
universities to mandate reporting to law enforcement, while perhaps well-
intentioned, are rife with problems.147
The tort law system also presents an avenue for victims of campus sexual
violence to seek redress for the harms perpetrated against them by allowing
for the pursuit of money damages from educational institutions and
individual assailants; a tort-based approach is recommended by some
scholars,'48 but it can nonetheless prove challenging for a myriad of reasons,
including limits on liability imposed by the intentional nature of torts and
governmental immunity.49 And while there is also a Title IX grievance
procedure available through the OCR, its focus is largely on compliance and
eliminating future harms at the institution. This option by itself does not
provide a sufficient remedy; while one outcome might be for the OCR to
require a school to review its handling of a particular case, it is largely focused
on institutional compliance with the mandates of Title IX. To be sure, "such
a process does not provide the same deterrent effect that a civil suit for money
damages provides."so Therefore, Title IX and its private right of action
remains a valuable tool that serves multiple ends: compensating victims when
a school responds with deliberate indifference to acts sexual violence, and
cultivating safer campus communities.
the prosecution and conviction of rapists in the United States because police disbelieve rape
victims far more often than the public and other agents involved in rape investigations).
143. SeeDan Barry etal., As FBI. Took a Year toPursue the Nassar Case, Dozens Say They Were Molested,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2O18/o2/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Cantalupo, supra note 13o, at 284.
147. See, e.g., Alexandra Brodsky, Against Taking Rape "Seriously": The Case Against Mandatory
ReferralLaws for Campus Gender Violence, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. s3', 131-33 (2018) (discussing
why mandatory referral rules for on-campus gender violence may actually discourage victims from
reporting, leaving them without access to crucial help and services).
148. See, e.g., Swan, Tort Law, supra note 138, at 986.
149. Andrea A. Curcio, Institutional Failure, Campus Sexual Assault and Danger in the Dorms:
Regulatory Limits and the Promise of Tort Law, 78 MONT. L. REV. 31, 34 (2017) (arguing that tort law
offers promise for campus sexual assault survivors, subject to certain revisions).
150. Brief of Amici Curiae Equal Means Equal et al., Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3 d 127 (1stCir. 2ox8) (No. 17-1941), 2018 WL 121o618, at *12 [hereinafter Equal Means Equal BriefJ.
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V. THE EXCLUSION OF CAMPUS VISITORS FROM THE PROTECTION
OF TITLE IX
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX to contain an implied
private right of action against a school for its failure to comply with the federal
law;' s although this right is not embedded in the statute itself, the Court has
refined the requirements necessary to bring a claim. s5 This Part outlines the
requisite legal standard, and then reviews the limited case law in which non-
students have sought redress vis-a-vis a private right of action under the statute
for schools' failure to adequately respond to the harms perpetrated by those
who are an official part of an institution. This question of non-student
standing is a critical threshold inquiry that requires resolution before a court
can rule on the merits of a claim.
A. EXPLORING THIE STANDARD
When Title IX was initially passed, it did not explicitly provide for a
private cause of action. The early Title IX cases, therefore, were regularly
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This
landscape changed in 1979, however, with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Cannon v. University of Chicago. 53 In Cannon, the Court compared Title IX to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 Conceding it would have been
preferable for Congress to explicitly have embedded language in the statute
showing its intention to provide for a private cause of action, the Court
nonetheless found that the legislative history evidenced a connection to Title
VI, which did include such a provision, and, therefore there was sufficient
evidence to find the existence of an implied remedy.:55 The Cannon opinion,
however, only provided for injunctive or equitable relief, and not money
damages. 56 The Court held in a subsequent opinion, Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Schools, that money damages are available upon a showing of an
intentional Title IX violation.'57 This holding has since been refined to create
the current standard, which allows for a private right of action when the
institution is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment. "This private cause
of action has evolved to allow for the recovery of monetary damages when the
151. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1979); see aso Franklin v. Gwinnett
Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
152. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998); see aso Davis v.
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1999).
153. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 684-85.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156d. in at 685 i
157. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
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institution manifests a deliberate indifference to the harassment of a student
after being notified of previous harassment."'5 5
The Supreme Court further evolved the standard for pursuing a private
cause of action through its decisions in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, which held that a school can be liable when an official "has actual
notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct,"'59 and
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, which extended the Gebser holding
from teacher-student to peer-based harassment.,6 o The Court in Gebser
"rejected the applicability of respondeat superior or vicarious liability principles
to Title IX claims of sexual harassment perpetrated by an institution's
employee. An institution is not responsible for discrimination or harassment
perpetrated by its employee; it is liable only for its own deliberate indifference
to such discrimination or harassment."',6 Finally in Davis, the Court extended
the private right of action to student on student harassment, finding "the
funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which
the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." 62
This standard still applies in Title IX cases today.
Clarification of the various aspects of the deliberate indifference
requirement, however, is ongoing. There is a split among circuit courts
"regarding whether a private cause of action can exist against an institution
when there is no post-notice harassment of the student."' 63 Attorney Zach
Cormier explores the ways the various courts have addressed the question of
whether simply leaving a student vulnerable to harassment, but without
accompanying evidence of ongoing harassment, is enough to support a
private cause of action under the deliberate indifference standard.'64
However, courts have divided over whether a student may recover
such damages if the institution's deliberate indifference does not
actually result in post-notice harassment. More specifically, it remains
unclear whether a student may recover damages under Title IX simply
because the student remained vulnerable to potential harassment as a
result of the institution's deliberate indifference., 65
158. Zachary Cormier, Is Vulnerability Enough? Analyzing theJurisdictional Divide on the Requirement
for Post-Notice Harassment in Title IX Litigation, 29 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1, (2017).
159. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 275 (1998).
i6o. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643-44, 648 (1999).
161. Cormier, supra note 158, at 8-9 (citing Gebser 524 U.S. at 285-91).
162. Davis, 526 U.S. at 629.
163. Cormier, supra note 158, at 3.
164. Id. (arguing that there should be a requirement of a showing of "post-notice
harassment" to trigger liability).
165. Id.
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Among the circuits, some (First and Eleventh) find "that a private cause of
action exists based on vulnerability alone"' 66 and others (Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, and federal district courts) "have held that the Davis Court's
definition of 'subjected' still requires that vulnerability result in further
harassment in order to be actionable." 67 This wide jurisdictional split will
likely at some point be resolved by the Supreme Court. The Court has
previously defined the statutory language "subjected to discrimination" to
mean that to be actionable, a plaintiff must demonstrate a school acted with
deliberate indifference to the harassment of a student after receiving notice
of this harassment.' 68 "If a recipient does not engage in harassment directly,
it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference 'subject[s]'
its students to harassment, i.e., at a minimum, causes students to undergo
harassment or makes them liable or vulnerable to it.",69 Substantial
disagreement exists regarding the interpretation of whether a school in fact
subjected an individual to discrimination by its inaction. Cormier identifies
the jurisdictional split that has occurred "regarding whether a private cause
of action can exist against an institution when there is no post-notice
harassment of the student."17o He is critical of how some courts have been
willing to find deliberate indifference only if it "left the student vulnerable to
harassment, even if that vulnerability did not result in further harassment."''
Taken together, the Gebser and Davis cases suggest that individuals in
educational settings do have a right to be free from sexual imposition, but
also that colleges and universities have little to fear if they fail to take
protection of that right seriously. "Indeed, the cases arguably incentivize[]
institutions to 'bury their heads in the sand' rather than actively prevent rights
violations, lest they accrue the kind of knowledge that might trigger
liability." 72 Ignorance is essentially rewarded.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the deliberate indifference standard created by
the Court has not been without its critics. Citing its limitations, Professor
Catharine MacKinnon recently advocated for the standard's replacement with
a human rights framework, relying instead on an evaluation of "due diligence"
to evaluate institutional liability.73 MacKinnon argues that since its creation
and repeated judicial "application, the deliberate indifference standard has
repeatedly and disproportionately been deployed against survivors'
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id.
168. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
169. Id. at 63o.
170. Cormier, supra note 158, at 3.
171. Id.at 4 .
172. Tani, supra note 1 15, at 1861-62 (quoting Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in
the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual
Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 205 (2011)).
173. Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual
Harassment in Education, 12 5 YALE L.J. 2038, 2041 (2016).
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cases, including when administrative handling of their situations is
concededly callous, incompetent, unresponsive, inept, and inapt."'74
MacKinnon criticizes the standard in part because the prevalence of sexual
violence has not decreased on campuses.75 "The standard permits a wide
margin of tolerance for sexual abuse, appearing predicated on a belief in its
inevitability, especially in the helplessness of officials and authorities to
prevent or eliminate it among young people."'76 However problematic and
imperfect this standard might indeed be, "outsiders" who are raped on
campus may never get the opportunity to even make the argument for its
applicability to their case if they are denied standing to bring a lawsuit in the
first place.
B. CASES INVOLVING CAMPUS VISITORs
As of the date of the publication of this Article, only two district courts
have definitively ruled on the issue of a non-student suing a federally funded
education institution for violations of Title IX.'77 The following section
outlines these two cases-KT. v. Culver-Stockton College and Doe v. Brown
University-involving non-students who were sexually assaulted on campuses.
The district courts addressed specifically the question of the ability of non-
students to bring causes of action against federally funded institutions where
the assaults took place. Plaintiffs in both cases appealed the decisions that
came out against them to the Eighth and First Federal Circuit Courts,
respectively, and a discussion of those cases subsequently follows.
1. K. T. v. Culver-Stockton College
In K. T. v. Culver-Stockton College, a high school soccer recruit was invited
to visit the school's campus as part of an "athletic activity" that was "sponsored
and promoted by Culver-Stockton College."'78 While she was on campus, K.T.
was sexually assaulted at the Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity house by a student
enrolled at the college.'79 Although K.T. was not herself yet a student at the
university, she reported the incident to law enforcement and attempted to file
a complaint under the school's Title IX policy, but Culver-Stockton College
never commenced an investigation.,so K.T. ultimately initiated a lawsuit
against the school in "response to the alleged assault" and the school's "failure
to investigate and provide guidance, counseling, and treatment" under a
theory of deliberate indifference under Title IX of the Education
174. Id. at 2040- 4 1.
175. Id. at 20 4 1.
176. Id. at 20 4 1.
177. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
178. KT. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4 :i6-CV-i6 5 , 2016 WL 4243965, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 11, 2016).
179. Id.
1 80. Id. at* 1-2.
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Amendments of 1972. 8 The district court dismissed her complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court's
dismissal hinged on several grounds relevant to the questions addressed in
this Article, first surrounding the plaintiffs status as a non-student of the
institution where the assault took place and second surrounding her failure
to state a claim under Title IX on which relief could be granted.
As relates to the first grounds for dismissal, the court held that that the
plaintiff lacked standing to sue the school because she was never actually a
student at that institution.,8 The court found K.T.'s non-student status
precluded her from asserting a claim for "student-on-student" harassment
established by the Supreme Court in Davis.,' The court was not persuaded by
the plaintiffs argument that because "she was invited by the College to visit
[the] campus as a potential student-athlete recruit, she is protected by Title
IX's underlying policy of protecting against sexual violence, and should have
all of the protection afforded to women athletes on the campus."8 5 The
defendant College argued, "there is no basis under either th[e] text of Title
IX or precedent interpreting the statute for the imposition of liability against
the College in the context of Plaintiffs claims of peer harassment.", 86 The
court agreed with defendant's position, explaining, "[t]he Court in
independent research has been unable to find any cases that directly address
the issue whether a non-student can assert a claim for student-on-student
harassment under Title IX."1 87 In reaching this conclusion, the court was
unwilling to expand the reach of Title IX in this issue of first impression
before it.
In analyzing the issue of standing, the court looked directly to the
statutory language of Title IX.'88 Finding nothing in the plain language of the
statute itself and refusing to interpret the "any person" language as inclusive
of non-students, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Davis to
arrive at its "conclu[sion] that Title IX's protections in the context of student-
on-student harassment are limited to students."'5 9 Interestingly, however,
Davis was not a case involving non-students, and it is difficult know whether
the Supreme Court's language really meant to confer the protections of Title
IX only to students and explicitly deny to non-students those same rights. The
Culver-Stockton court also disagreed with the "plaintiffs argument [that] any
person invited to visit a college campus would have standing to sue for
181. Id.at*2.
182. Id.at*1i.
183. Id. at *4-6.
184. Id. at *4-5.
185. Id.at* 5.
186. Id. at *4.
187. Id. at * 5.
188. Id. at *6.
189. Id.
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student-on-student harassment under Title IX.",9o The basis for its position
was that it "would impermissibly expand the law's scope beyond the limited
right of action recognized by the Supreme Court that requires a 'systemic
effect on educational programs or activities."'9' The court was unwilling to
provide a broad definition to this phrase. The court continued: "[E]ven
assuming that Title IX's protection against student-on-student harassment
could extend to persons other than enrolled students, plaintiff has failed to
allege facts to show that she was excluded from participation, denied the
benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity offered by the College."192 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
effectively conflates two related but also explicitly distinct issues: (1) standing
to sue in the first place, and (2) satisfaction of the relevant legal standards
required for a positive determination of a school's deliberate indifference.
Regarding the second grounds for dismissal, the court found that
allegations surrounding a single incident of discrimination, even if true, do
not rise to a level of having a "systemic effect on educational programs or
activities."'93 Further, the court did not find that Culver-Stockton was
deliberately indifferent to the sex discrimination alleged, stating, "[t]he
College contends that while plaintiff may claim she suffered some harm by its
alleged inaction, she does not and cannot allege that she was subjected to any
sexual harassment or gender discrimination after it received actual notice."'94
The court ultimately concluded that "[b]ased on Supreme Court precedent
. . . Title IX's protection against student-on-student harassment does not
extend to permit a private action for damages by a non-student invited to visit
the College for student-athlete recruiting purposes." 95 This decision appears
to be the first to make a distinction among the kinds of victims who are
entitled to protection under Title IX.
2. Jane Doe v. Brown University
A subsequent district court case decided in Rhode Island involving a
Brown University student and a non-student had a similar outcome.'96 In Jane
Doe v. Brown University, the plaintiff met three Brown University student
football players at a local bar, off campus, in downtown Providence.'97 The
students allegedly drugged the plaintiff, who was a student a different school,
and later sexually assaulted her at a Brown University dorm.'9 8 Months
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999)).
192. Id. at *7 .
193. Id. at *6.
194. Id. at *9.
195. Id. at *5 .
196. Doe v. Brown Univ., 27o F. Supp. 3 d 556, 556 (D.R.I. 2017).
197. Id. at 5 5 8.
198. Id.
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following the assault, Jane Doe contacted both Brown University and
Providence law enforcement,,9 and she also attempted to file a complaint
under the university's Title IX policy on sex discrimination.2oo Brown initially
agreed to pursue an investigation into her complaint under the student code,
but refused to do so under Title IX.201 Ultimately, "Brown informed her that
it never completed the inquiry concerning her assault and abandoned any
disciplinary action against the three Brown students."202
In this case, the court explained the conundrum surrounding Doe's
complaint: "Plaintiff Jane Doe seeks to expand the scope of Title IX
protection to include persons experiencing gender discrimination who are
not students or staff at the offending school."2o The court relied on Culver-
Stockton as precedent, referring to it as the "only ... published opinion that
the Court or the parties could find,"2o4 and took this case as persuasive
evidence that the non-student plaintiff in this case had no right to sue Brown
University given her status as an outsider to the school.20o In its analysis, the
court found only that "[t]he developing case law has designated only two
categories of protected individuals: enrolled students and school
employees."-o`
Because of the limited case law and the fact that this non-student standing
question was an issue of first impression before it, the Rhode Island District
Court looked to the legislative history of Title IX for further guidance on how
to resolve the question of whether a school is liable to an individual who is not
enrolled as a student at the institution.207 In doing so, the court found
persuasive a statement made by the sponsor and author of Title IX, Senator
Birch E. Bayh, who identified three different kinds of discrimination
considered under the statute: "We are dealing with discrimination in
admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies within an
institution once students are admitted and discrimination in employment within
an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever."2o8 The Doe court found
these distinctions from the Congressional discussion surrounding the passage
199. Id. The police subsequently commenced an investigation, which resulted in the
production of significant evidence. Medical tests revealed the existence of several date rape drugs
in Doe's system. And the police also confiscated cell phones belonging to the alleged
perpetrators. "The cell phones revealed communications that referenced rape and contained
explicit photographs of Ms. Doe taken at the time of the sexual assault." Id.
200. Id.
2oi. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 562.
205- Id.
206. Id. at 5 6o.
207. Id. at 5 61.
208. Id. (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535-38 (1982) (quoting
1 18 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972)) (emphasis added)).
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of Title IX make a compelling argument that "Congress intended Title IX to
protect against discrimination of students admitted to the offending
school. "209
In the court's view, because the plaintiff was not actually enrolled at
Brown, the school exercised no "control or influence" over her educational
programs, and therefore the discrimination and sexual violence she alleged
did not occur within such a context.2 0 The court's interpretation of who is
protected by Title IX is very narrow in that it does not extend the protections
of the law to anyone beyond actual enrolled students: "Ms. Doe was not a
student at Brown University and therefore Brown's acts or failures to act could
not have prevented her from getting an education at Providence College,
where Brown does not have any control or influence over the educational
programs in which Ms. Doe was enrolled."31 This perspective effectively
denies the protections of Title IX to a significant number of individuals who
interact with the university in a myriad of contexts.
In contemplating future application of the Doe opinion, it appears that
the non-student status of a complainant is determinative. "Finding that Ms.
Doe's status as a non-student ... removes her from Title IX's private-cause-of-
action umbrella of protection . . . ."212 However, it is worth highlighting the
court's finding that "[t]he case law specifies that the discrimination must
occur in the school's educational programs or activities."213 Although the Doe
court did not interpret the facts of the case as sufficiently intersecting with
Brown's programs or activities, is it possible that under a different set of facts
involving a closer nexus between the non-student and the university, the
outcome might be favorable to such a complainant or at minimum provide a
basis for making such an argument?
3. Appeals to the Federal Courts
Plaintiffs in both the aforementioned district court cases appealed their
decisions to their respective federal circuit courts. K. T. v. Culver-Stockton
College was ultimately dismissed by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the court ruled
without addressing the question of standing,214 which was disappointing to
many who are eagerly anticipating higher court review of this important issue.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals similarly considered an appeal in Doe v.
Brown University and rendered its decision inJuly, 2018, affirming the district
2o9. Id. (emphasis omitted) (relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in North Haven Board
ofEducation v. Bell that conceded that while one Senator's remarks might not be controlling, they
nonetheless can be indicative of legislative intent, especially when coming from the bill's author).
21o. Id.at 5 62.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 5 6 3.
213. Id.
214. KT. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F-3 d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2017).
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court's decision.25 Although decided in slightly different ways, the net effect
of these appellate decisions forecloses outsiders from accessing the
protections of Title IX.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an appeal in the K. T. v.
Culver-Stockton College case, but declined to rule on the specific question of
non-student standing, an issue of first impression before the court, and
instead dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6)
for plaintiffs failure to state a claim.2 5 As to the central issue in this case
regarding standing, the parties disagreed whether the plaintiff was entitled to
sue as a non-student of that university; nonetheless, to the disappointment of
many who were watching this case carefully for clarification, the Eighth
Circuit chose not to address this question, instead focusing on the substance
of the deliberate indifference claim.217 The court stated simply: "The parties
dispute whether KT.'s status as a non-student precludes her from asserting a
Title IX harassment claim. Assuming arguendo that it does not, we find no
merit in KT.'s appeal because her complaint failed to state a plausible claim
to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6)."28
In its analysis of the merits of the claim itself, the Eighth Circuit evaluated
three elements of the relevant legal standard to determine liability: (1) the
school's actual knowledge of the discrimination; (2) the severity and
pervasiveness of the discrimination; (3) and the school's deliberate
indifference to the discrimination.19
First, the court found that K.T. asserted no facts
that the College was aware of invited high-school aged recruits,
visitors or College students being assaulted in similar
circumstances, or that the College was aware of any prior
allegations of sexual assault by [the same alleged perpetrator]'
... K.T. failed to plausibly allege that Culver-Stockton had actual
knowledge of discrimination within the meaning of a Title IX
peer harassment claim.220
Second, the court did not agree that the discrimination experienced by
K.T. was sufficiently severe since it involved only one instance of sexual assault.
Relying on Davis' requirement that one instance alone is insufficient, the
court was unconvinced. "Although we are sympathetic to K.T.'s circumstances
and agree that she has alleged opprobrious misconduct on the part of the
fraternity member, K.T.'s singular grievance on its own does not plausibly
215. Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3 d 127, 133 (1st Cir. 2018).
216. K.T., 86 5 F.3d at 1059.
217. See id.
218. Id.at 1057.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1059.
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allege pervasive discrimination as required to state a peer harassment
claim. "22
Finally, the court did not find that the university acted with deliberate
indifference toward sexual harassment on campus.2 2 2 As a starting place, KT.
argued the university failed "take reasonable protective measures such as
supervising KT. during her visit" and second, the university did not
"investigate and provide treatment for KT. once the College received reports
of the alleged incident."223 The court did not find that the complaint
illustrated the existence of a connection between the inaction of the university
and the harassment experienced by K.T.224 "[W] hile K.T. was dissatisfied with
Culver-Stockton's response, based on the allegations in the complaint the
response cannot be characterized as deliberate indifference that caused the
assault."225 The court's position represents one side of a jurisdictional split
regarding deliberate indifference and the requirement of post-notice
harassment.22 6
In the fall of 2017, plaintiffs in Doe v. Brown University filed an appeal of
the Rhode Island District Court's decision to the First Circuit Court of
Appeals.227 The Plaintiffs brief sought resolution of the Title IX conundrum
by asking one central question: "Does a victim of sex discrimination have a
private right of action under Title IX against the school where the
discrimination occurred, and where the perpetrators of discrimination were
enrolled, even though the victim was enrolled at a different school?"22 8 This
threshold inquiry about whether one's outsider status matters in the context
of Title IX formed the basis ofJane Doe's entire appeal.
Doe's appeal was developed around two major arguments. First, she
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, in
which the Court created a four-part test to determine if a party had a private
cause of action under Title IX.229 Applying that test to the facts in the case,
she articulated the following: (1) she was in fact a member of the class of
people Title IX intended to protect; (2) legislative history supports a private
cause of action for third parties who are participating in a school's programs
or activities; (3) a private cause of action for third parties aligns with the
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1o 5 7 .
223. Id. at io 5 6.
224. Id.atio 5 8.
225. Id.
226. See Cormier, supra note 158, at 1-2.
227. Brief of Plaintiff-AppellantJane Doe, Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3 d 127 (2st Cir. 2018)
(No. 17-1941), 2018 WL 509533, at * 1 [hereinafter Doe Appeal].
228. Id.at*2.
229. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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legislative purpose of Title IX; and (4) the subject matter of the case "involves
an area traditionally regulated by the federal courts. "230
Doe's second argument took issue with the district court's interpretation
of the meaning of "control."231 The district court found it was outside of
Brown University's reach to control Doe's education at Providence College,
the institution where she was enrolled.232 However, Doe argued that the focus
should not be on the control as relates to a victim's educational context but
instead whether a school has control over a perpetrator and the context in
which the perpetration of sexual violence occurs. 233 In making this argument,
she relied on the Davis decision, in which the Supreme Court held schools
can be liable to third parties.2 34 "The Court noted schools are traditionally
held responsible under state law for their failure to protect students from the
tortious acts of third parties, and similarly, may be held liable under Title IX
when they are deliberately indifferent to harassment 'where the funding
recipient has some control over the alleged harassment.' "235
Brown University's appellate brief, by contrast, was almost exclusively
focused on the merits of the case, with only brief attention paid to the issue
of non-student standing.23 6
Additionally, an amicus brief was filed by four organizations-Equal
Means Equal, National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, Allies Reaching for
Equality, and Faculty Against Rape-arguing in support of Jane Doe's
standing to sue Brown University for its alleged deliberate indifference to the
sexual assault perpetrated against her by enrolled students at that
university.237 According to the Amici, " [t]he lower court's holding threatens
the public interest because every member of the public who sets foot on the
property of an institution covered by Title IX will be exposed to a greater risk
of harm, despite being protected 'persons,' according to the plain language
of Title IX."238 They argued for a reversal of the lower court's opinion "to
protect all covered class members equally from discrimination and to protect
the integrity of civil rights laws."239
In its 2018 opinion, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
holding that because Jane Doe was not excluded from participation in the
programs or activities of Brown University, she could not satisfy the necessary
230. Doe Appeal, supra note 227, at *17.
231. Id.at*I8-29.
232. See id. at *2-3
233. Id.at*18-21.
234. Id. at *20 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644-45 (1999)).
235. Id.
236. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3 d 127 (Ist Cir. 2018)
(No. 17 -19 4 1), 2018 WL 1378381, at *38-41.
237. See generally Equal Means Equal Brief, supra note 150 (explaining why Jane Doe and
other similarly situated students do have standing to sue).
238. Id.at*5.
239. Id.
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requirements to bring a claim under Title IX.240 From the court's perspective,
Doe failed to establish that she had "be [en] subjected to discrimination under
[Brown's] education program or activity."2' The court acknowledged Doe's
argument that liability attaches under Title IX when an institution has control
over the perpetrator and the context where sexual violence occurs, but was
not compelled to address the issue because it found her complaint failed on
its face. The First Circuit's opinion seems to suggest that a non-student cannot
sue an educational institution for its deliberate indifference to allegations of
sexual assault under Title IX. However, the relatively short opinion leaves
unanswered the question of what exactly constitutes a "program or activity" of
a university sufficient to satisfy Title IX and further, whether a non-student
who is found to have participated in such a "program or activity" would be
able to succeed in a Title IX complaint.
VI. RESOLVING THE TITLE IX CONUNDRUM
The conundrum of who exactly is entitled to protection under Title IX
deserves serious consideration and demands clarification in law and policy,
especially given the widespread prevalence and incidence of sexual violence
on college campuses and the existence of Title IX as a viable tool to address
this problem. It is an important threshold inquiry that must be resolved before
courts can consider whether a school indeed acted with deliberate
indifference to reports of sexual violence. There is little if any disagreement
with the idea that the statute was designed to address discrimination on the
basis of sex and thereby preserve access to education for those who are
participating in the programs and activities of a university. Questions arise,
however, related to the extent of Title IX's reach and the ways in which it
applies. In this current inquiry, a very real conundrum exists as to exactly how
far the statute extends and exactly who is entitled to its protections. Resolving
this conundrum in the face of limited case law and legislative history proves
challenging, especially given the incredible newness and novelty of even the
question itself. The following section offers a few theories both for and against
inclusivity in the application of Title IX. To be sure, this is merely a beginning,
not end, of the inquiry and I invite other scholars to take up these questions
and propose additional solutions.
A. ToWARD AN INCLUSIVE RESOLUTION
It seems inherently reasonable and within the letter of the Title IX statute
to extend the federal law's protections to those who participate in a school's
programs and activities, even if that participation is temporary. There are a
number of theories that support such a conclusion: (1) statutory
interpretation of Title IX; (2) analogous judicial opinions in other related
240. Doe v. Brown Univ., 89 6 F.3 d 127, 133 (istCir. 2018).
241. Id.
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contexts; and (3) constitutional equal protection concerns that arise from
creating separate classes of victims. This section explores these preliminary
theories, but does so with the caveat that it is only a starting place for this
important and ongoing conversation.
1. Statutory Language
As discussed earlier, the statutory language of Title IX is extraordinarily
vague.242 Certainly, Congress could have defined the statute's terms in its
original or subsequent incarnation much more narrowly to guarantee
application to only certain classes of individuals-like enrolled students-but
it did not do so. 4i In this way, an expansive reading of Title IX that allows
application of the statute to non-students does not necessarily conflict with
the statute's plain language and as the following section will discuss, is also
consistent with its intention. The reach of Title IX has extended well beyond
what was likely intended by the original drafters, giving way to the possibility
of further refinement. Title IX's evolution to address campus sexual assault
reveals an extension from its original conception, which focused almost
exclusively on access to education.244 This contemporary ambiguity begs
resolution by the Office of Civil Rights, Congress, or the courts. A finding that
the statute applies to campus visitors would confer standing onto this class of
individuals, allowing them to make the argument that a school acted with
deliberate indifference and proceed with a private cause of action.
If a victim of sexual violence has evidence to suggest that an institution
acted with deliberate indifference to her report of sexual violence, and she
desires to try and hold the institution accountable for its indifference, she
must make the case that she has standing to file a lawsuit; this requirement is
a critical threshold matter. The judicially defined standard for imposing Title
IX liability has been created almost exclusively from cases involving parties
who are all members of an educational community, as either students, staff,
or faculty. As a result, it appears that an assumption has been made that only
actual members of an institution have access to protection under the federal
law, but this assumption has not been subject to significant judicial scrutiny.
The case law has involved these specific facts, but courts have not been called
on to address the question beyond the few lower courts discussed in the
preceding sections of this Article.
There are two specific areas of focus included in the statutory language
of Title IX that may be interpreted to permit protection of non-students or
campus visitors: (1) "no person;" (2) "program or activity." The following
242. See supra Part II.
243. There is support for this position in case law. See Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ.,
257 F. Supp. 3 d 1112, 1125 (D. Kan. 2017).
244. For a comprehensive overview of Title IX from inception through its 40 years as a federal
civil rights law see Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review off orty Legal
Developnents That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 326 (2012).
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sections will discuss this language and how it could be interpreted to apply to
non-students.
i. "No Person"
The language of Title IX is vague and does not affirmatively reflect who
is entitled to protection beyond reference that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."245 The law does not
explicitly or implicitly address the question whether one who is not a student
or member of a university community is entitled to bring a claim but instead
appears to encompass anyone who interacts with a federally funded education
institution. Contemplation of the specific rights of non-students to sue an
institution was likely not on the minds of legislators when Title IX was passed.
Nonetheless, to this point, in an amicus brief submitted on behalf ofJane Doe
in her appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the authors argue: "It is
clear ... that the architects of Title IX intended it to protect all persons, not
just students enrolled at a particular institution."4 6
Arguably, a strict statutory reading allows for interpretation that non-
students are protected by Title IX, especially absent any actual language
embedded in the statute or its accompanying guidelines that speaks directly
to this issue. "Excluding such persons from civil rights protections when they
suffer sex-based discrimination on the grounds of an entity that receives
federal funds effectively permits federal money to be used to discriminate: the
exact opposite of what Congress intended when it enacted Title IX almost 50
years ago."247
The guiding documents promulgated by the Department of Education
designed to interpret Title IX are voluminous, yet they do not explicitly
address whether non-students are protected by the statute, and instead tend
to mirror the statutory language by adopting language that encompasses
obvious individuals like students but also extending its reach to include "other
persons." The 2o5 Title IX Resource Guide produced by the Department of
Education Office for Civil Rights illustrates this breadth in defining who is
protected by the federal law.
Title IX protects students, employees, applicants for admission and
employment, and other persons from all forms of sex
discrimination, including discrimination based on gender identity
or failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or
femininity. All students (as well as other persons) at recipient
institutions are protected by Title IX-regardless of their sex, sexual
245. See2o U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
246. Equal Means Equal Brief, supra note 15o, at *7 (emphasis in original).
247. Id.at*1 5.
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orientation, gender identity, part- or full-time status, disability, race,
or national origin-in all aspects of a recipient's educational
programs and activities.24IS
This language suggests that it was contemplated Title IX apply to students-
both those admitted and those who have applied for admission-employees,
and also to "other persons" who do not easily fit into those categories. The
Resource Guide references twice, but does not define or expand upon,
specifically who it envisions to be encompassed by its broad phrase, "other
persons."2.1
The Office for Civil Rights also promulgated another document, the
Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, in 2014.250 This
comprehensive guide anticipates numerous questions that schools may have
related to Title IX's implementation and provides answers to these questions.
The document "further clarif[ies] the legal requirements and guidance
articulated in the DCL and the 2001 Guidance and include examples of
proactive efforts schools can take to prevent sexual violence and remedies
schools may use to end such conduct, prevent its recurrence, and address its
effects."25- Within the almost 50 pages of clarifying material, there is not one
reference to whether non-students or non-affiliated university staff/faculty are
subject to the protections of a school's Title IX policy.252
The Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence does, however,
address non-student status vis-d-vis the liability related to a perpetrator of
sexual violence who does not attend the school where a sexual assault has
taken place.253 This is the closest analogy to the question this Article seeks to
address. The document reads: "Even though a school's ability to take direct
action against a particular perpetrator may be limited, the school must still
take steps to provide appropriate remedies for the complainant and, where
appropriate, the broader school population."254 The Questions and Answers on
Title IX and Sexual Violence concedes that while a school may not have much
control over an alleged perpetrator in this context, efforts should be taken to
investigate and notify the school where the alleged assailant is enrolled.255
Here, the document also seems to express concern about the safety of the
"broader school population."25 6
248. RESOURCE GUIDE, Sufra nOte 102, at i.
249. Id.
250. U.S. DEP'T or EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIG-TS, QUESIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201 4 o4 -tide-ix.pdf.
251. Id. at ii.
252. See generally id. (referring only to students and affiliated university faculty and staff).
253. Id. at 9.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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Case law outside the instant context may provide limited guidance
relative to who is actually covered by the statute. In Fox v. Pittsburgh State, a
case involving ajanitor employed at the university who was sexually harassed
in her employment context, the U.S. District Court held that the Title IX
statute is not just limited to students.57 "Instead, Title IX broadly covers any
'person,' not just students, alleging discrimination."25 8 The court reasoned
further that a reading of Title IX that excludes non-students from its reach
simply does not comport with the plain language of the statute
-"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. "259 The court found further support for its position by looking to
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has read "no person"
broadly aslNorth Havenputs it so aptly, "[b]ecause § [1681(a)] neither
expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its reach, we should
interpret the provision as covering and protecting these 'persons' unless other
considerations counsel to the contrary. After all, Congress easily could have
substituted 'student' or 'beneficiary' for the word 'person' if it had wished to
restrict the scope of § [1681 (a)] ."26o
ii. "Program or Activity"
The standing issue is not unrelated to the express Title IX provision that
it prohibits discrimination in a school's "program or activity."261 The question
as to what exactly this means has proved to be a source of confusion. Earlier
guidelines promulgated in 1997 by the Department of Education do appear
to define, at least generally, what is meant by this phrase. The guidelines read:
The "education program or activity" of a school includes all of the
school's operations. This means that Title IX protects students in
connection with all of the academic, educational, extra-curricular,
athletic, and other programs of the school, whether they take place
in the facilities of the school, on a school bus, at a class or training
program sponsored by the school at another location, or
elsewhere.62
257. Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F.Supp.3d i 1 12, 1112 (D. Kan. 2017).
258. Id. at 1123.
259. Id. at 1124 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting 2o U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012)).
26o. Id. at 1125 (alterations in original) (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512,521 (1982)).
261. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
262. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE 1997(citation omitted), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexharoi.html (last visited
Aug. 24, 2oi8).
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This description, taken literally, would appear to extend the protections of
Title IX fairly broadly to the far corners of a school's endeavors, and certainly
beyond just the classroom or dormitories. However, the guidelines also
include language specifically about protecting "students," 63 which may
perhaps reflect an assumption, or intention, that those entitled to receive the
protective benefit of the law are those enrolled at a particular institution.
Congress also attempted to further clarify the meaning of the "programs
or activities" phrase in passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act in 1987.261
According to the Act, the term "program or activity" refers to "all of the
operations" in a given "college, university, or other postsecondary institution,
or a public system of higher education."2 65 One of the objectives of the Act
was to clarify that if any part of a school received federal funds, this triggered
Title IX liability across the entire institution. "Indeed, the Senate Report
addressing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ("CRRA") clarified that
discrimination is 'prohibited throughout entire agencies or institutions if any
part receives Federal financial assistance,' and that 'all of the operations of'
an educational institution or system would include, but is not limited
to: 'traditional educational operations, faculty and student housing, campus
shuttle bus service, campus restaurants, the bookstore, and other commercial
activities.' "266
The purpose of the CRAA was discussed by the court in Fox v. Pittsburg
State University. "Overall, the amendment's purpose was to reaffirm pre-Grove
City Collegejudicial and executive branch interpretations and enforcement
practices which provided for 'broad coverage' of the anti-discrimination
provisions of these civil rights statutes.. . . Indeed, the word 'broad' is used 35
times in the legislative history of the 1987 amendment alone."2 6 7 In Fox, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the 1987 amendment to Title
IX only decided the issue of whether the institution as a whole is covered, and
that a plaintiff would still need to establish a "nexus" to educational programs
or activities.2 6 8
2. Judicial Opinions
Beyond the two central cases discussed in this Article, Jane Doe v. Brown
University and K. T v. Culver-Stockton College, other courts have, in different but
analogous contexts, made useful references that support extension of Title IX
beyond a narrow subset of enrolled students. This section highlights one of
these cases.
263. Id.
264. 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
265. Id.
266. Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 2 5 7 F. Supp. 3 d 1 112, 1124-25 (D. Kan. 2017).
267. Id.at1125.
268. Id.
2018] 133
IOWA LAWREVIEW
Fox, as discussed in the previous section, involved a similar set of
circumstances as the instant context.2 69 The case involved a Title IX claim
brought against a school for its deliberate indifference to allegations of sexual
harassment perpetrated against a woman who was employed as ajanitor.270 As
part of its defense strategy, the university argued that its groundskeepers or
maintenance workers should be treated differently than its faculty members
for purposes of Title IX protections.27, The court rejected the defendant-
school's reasoning, and instead allowed for a broad interpretation of which
university employees are protected by Title IX, ultimately refusing to
differentiate between "types" of employees.272 "Nothing Defendant cites
persuades this Court that Title IX is meant to allow claims by some of these
employees but not all. Title IX must be given 'a sweep as broad as its
language.'273 This argument for statutory breadth is at odds with the First
Circuit's opinion in Jane Doe's appeal, which appears to restrict the
protections of Title IX to students who are enrolled at the institution where
sexual violence occurs. Nonetheless, the perspective of the Fox court is a
powerful one that logically could extend to non-students or other campus
visitors.
3. Equal Protection
In the context of students and non-students being treated differently by
federally funded institutions of higher education, an equal protection
question almost inevitably arises. Is there a legitimate government interest in
treating these two classes of victims differently? Amici who wrote in support
of Jane DOE's case against Brown University made the argument that, "It is
not rational to provide full remedies to students who visit museums, but not
students who visit other schools . . .. Title IX's protections must be applied
and enforced uniformly among all members of a protected class and in all
places where federal funding prohibits discrimination."274
In general, there has not been much written about the intersection of
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.275 However, as Attorney David
Cohen explains, "The relationship between Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause is relevant to many areas of sex discrimination law. First and foremost,
the issue has arisen when courts have attempted to determine the scope of
269. Id. at 1126.
270. Id. at 1118-19, 113i.
271. Id.at 126.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Equal Means Equal Brief, supra note 237, at *14.
275. See David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARv.J.L. & GENDER 217, 240
(2005) ("[T] here is no single or even dominant view about the relationship between Title IX and
the Equal Protection Clause.").
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Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination."27 6 Cohen continues, "In most
areas of sex discrimination jurisprudence, and especially under the Equal
Protection Clause, the concept of formal equality-treating similarly situated
individuals alike-has guided the courts."77 The equal protection dimension
of the Title IX conundrum deserves further exploration.
B. ARGUMENTS FOR ExcLusioN
A number of arguments can also be made for excluding non-students from
the protections of Title IX. Some of these arguments are grounded in the
same exact context as those for inclusion as highlighted in the previous
section: existing case law and the Title IX statute itself. The most persuasive
arguments for excluding non-students rest squarely on the paucity of cases,
statutory vagueness, and lack of contemporary Department of Education
guidance on point.
Almost every case brought against a university under Title IX on the basis
of the school's alleged deliberate indifference involves victims who were
enrolled students at that university. To be sure, student on student sexual
violence is likely the most common to occur in a campus context. The dearth
of case law involving non-student victims may stem from this reality as well as
the fact that, as outsiders, non-students may not be aware of Title IX policies
or the opportunity to file a complaint with the school.
1. Judicial Opinions
There are no cases that have been decided to date that extend Title IX
protections to campus visitors. And while it may be easy to disagree with the
outcome of the lower courts and federal appellate review in both K. T. v. Culver
Stockton College and Doe v. Brown University, this small collection of cases is
unanimous in their holdings regarding non-student access to Title IX. The
recent MSU cases filed by the victims of Dr. Nassar against that university
might have resulted in more extensive judicial interpretation of this question
had they not been settled.278
In a different yet related context, the Tenth Circuit included an
offhanded reference to non-students in Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder.
This case resulted in a novel approach to interpret the deliberate indifference
standard79 and has been the subject of scholarly scrutiny.2 80 In Simpson, the
court reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment for the
University of Colorado involving the perpetuation of systemic sexual abuse in
the school's athletic recruiting program.28, While the holding itself does not
276. Id. at 218.
277. Id.at221.
278. See Smith & Hartocollis, supra note o.
279. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 5 oo F.3 d 1170, 1178 (ioth Cir. 2007).
280. See, e.g., McCart, supra note log, at 154.
281. Simpson, 5oo F. 3 d at 1 173.
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inform the discussion here, a part of its opinion is nonetheless relevant. The
court casually referenced the non-student standing issue when discussing a
sport recruiting program at the university.2 82 In addressing the central issue
in the case, which hinged on whether the occurrence of sexual assaults during
recruiting was obvious and a regular part of the athletic recruiting context,
the court referenced numerous instances where sexual assaults occurred. 83
One of the court's examples, which it interpreted as evidence of this
institutional culture of violence, involved a non-student victim.2 84 The court
reasoned: "As the IIC Report detailed, on December 6 a group of high-school
girls attended a party at an off-campus hotel hosted by a CU football player
for two visiting recruits. One of the girls alleged that she had been sexually
assaulted by recruits at the party."2 85 The evidence of sexual violence was used
to support the argument that there existed a culture of violence at the
university. The court emphasized how the victim's status as a non-student of
that university made her unable to access the protections of Title IX.286
"Although the victim was not a CU student protected by Title IX, that
circumstance is irrelevant to evaluation of the risk to CU women." 87 The
court found that the violence this particular victim experienced was relevant
to describing the culture of the athletic recruiting practices, and the dicta in
this Tenth Circuit case is a most explicit statement about the extension of Title
IX to non-students. The court provided no citation or other explanation for
its conclusory statement; taken at face value, it argues against Title IX's
application to campus visitors.
2. Statutory Language and Related Guidelines
As argued in the preceding section, the vague language of the Title IX
statute allows, on the one hand, for an expansive interpretation of its
application to cover all those who interact with the university. However, the
absence of such explicit references to non-students may also well justify their
exclusion. If it intended and expansive interpretation, Congress could
certainly have clarified its "no person" language to more readily make obvious
the individuals to whom it was referring.
Further, in the voluminous guidance promulgated over the years by the
Department of Education, there is not one reference to the rights of non-
student victims to be protected by Title IX, even when attention is directed to
non-student perpetrators. 288 Considering the breadth of topics addressed by
the various Dear Colleague Letters and other guiding documents, it is
282. Id. at 1181.
283. Id. at 1181-85.
284. Id. at 1 i81.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
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surprising that the DoE would not have included affirmative recognition of
non-students if that was indeed their intention.
VII. CONCLUSION
Assuming a victim of sexual violence believes that an institution acted
with deliberate indifference in its response to her Title IX complaint, making
the case that she has standing to file a lawsuit against the school becomes a
critical threshold matter. The judicially defined standard for imposing liability
in Title IX cases has largely been created from cases involving parties who are
all members of a university community, as students, teachers, and staff.
Therefore, it seems that a legal assumption has been made that only official
members of a school have a right of action under the federal law and this
assumption has not been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. The existing
case law almost exclusively involves enrolled student or employees, and courts
have not specifically been called on to address the rights of outsiders beyond
the two cases discussed throughout this Article.
Colleges and universities may not be entirely "total institutions" in the
way that Goffman and others might contemplate.2 89 That is, they are not so
completely isolated as to label them entirely closed, and they in fact thrive on
the constant influx of participants from the outside; thus, they are better
conceptualized as quasi-closed systems. 290 One of the features of a university
that distinguishes it from other more traditional closed settings like prison is
the practice of having non-system members regularly participate in its
programs and activities. High school students routinely make campus visits as
they decide which school to attend; community members attend lectures,
book signings, and other cultural and sporting events; patients visit doctor's
offices and medical treatment centers; and summer camps hold sessions on
campuses where participants become an integral part of the community. This
is but a narrow list of ways non-university members interface with members of
the university community officially, albeit temporarily, on a daily basis.
Colleges and universities anticipate that those from the "outside" will
inevitably, and necessarily, make their way in. Perhaps for this reason alone it
makes good sense to resist the temptation to create different theories of
liability for students and non-students and make available the protections of
Title IX to those who participate in the programs and activities, broadly
defined, of institutions of higher education. Notably, the settlement between
MSU and the hundreds of victims of Dr. Nassar, rightfully does not distinguish
between students and non-students. A different approach that denied relief
to Nassar's non-student victims would have been inherently unfair, unjust,
and at odds with the spirit of Title IX.
289. See Goffman, supra note 75, at 3 14-15.
290. Brenner & Darcy, supra note 2 1, at 132.
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One of the problems with relying exclusively on administrative law is the
potential for policy changes to occur with the whims of a given administration.
The interpretive ping pong that has characterized the last few decades of Title
IX regulations is illustrative of this dynamic. The approach taken by MSU in
its settlement should inform future judicial decision making, and Congress
should intervene to support a broader reading of Title IX in order to ensure
that campuses are free from sexual violence and able to effectively guarantee
access to education.
